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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Gerald M. Chapman*
Failure to Take Federal Prisoners Before Commissioner for Preliminary
Hearing Nullifies any Confession Obtained During Period of Unreason-
able Delay (The McNabb Case Rule Restated)-Until the recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Upshaw v. United States, 69 S. Ct.
170 (December 13, 1948), there was considerable uncertainty as to the
full effect upon the admissibility of confessions in federal cases of a
failure on the part of federal officers to take arrested persons without
unreasonable delay before the nearest available committing magistrate.
The language the Supreme Court used in the earlier case of McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), which laid down the so-called "civil-
ized standards" rule for federal criminal interrogators, seemed to indi-
cate, or at least was so interpreted by a number of lower federal courts,
that whenever federal officers failed to comply with a statutory mandate
regarding early arraignment, any confession obtained by them was
inadmissible in evidence. In a subsequent United States Supreme Court
case, United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944), the Court held that
a confession which preceded the unreasonable delay was unaffected by
the subsequent illegal action of the federal officers. In that case the
Court seemed to lay dawn a qualification to the original McNabb- case
rule to the effect that the mere fact of delay alone was insufficient to
nullify a confession, but that the delay must have had an "inducing
effect" on the confession. The one justice who dissented in the McNabb
case considered as very desirable the Mitchell case language qualification
of the original and seemingly much more rigid McNabb case rule. In
any event, the Mitchell case qualifying language gave rise to consider-
able uncertainty as to just how much 'inducing effect' was necessary to
affect the validity of a confession.
In the recent Upshaw case, the Court was faced with somewhat of a
dilemma. If the Court really meant what it seemed to say in the McNabb
case, a reversal of the Upshaw case conviction was in order. On the
other hand, if the qualifying language the Court used in the Mitchell
case was to be accorded any significance apart from its application to
the particular facts of that case, then the Court could find a basis for
upholding the conviction in the Upshaw case. That dilemma has now
been dispelled, for in its latest decision in the Upshaw case, the United
States Supreme Court has announced that it meant just what was said
in the McNabb case. In other words, as the law now stands, if federal
officers do not comply with Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules and Crim-
inal Procedure, which requires that an officer 'making an arrest "shall
take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest
available committing magistrate," any confession obtained thereafter,
however voluntary it might otherwise be, is inadmissible. (For a dis-
cussion of this general problem and particularly for a discussion of the
policeman's side of this whole issue, see Inbau, "The Confession Dilemma
in the United States Supreme Court" (1948) 43 Ill. L. Rev. 442.)
United States Supreme Court Decision on Search and Seizure in
Gambling Case-Suspecting, on the basis of a previous record, that the
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petitioner, McDonald, was carrying on a numbers game in a rented
room in the District of Columbia, three police officers surrounded the
rooming house. Hearing an adding machine inside (commonly used
in numbers operations), one of the officers, without having obtained
a search or arrest warrant, climbed through a window, identified himself
to the landlady, and proceeded to admit the other officers. On looking
over the transom of McDonald's room, the officers saw him with num-
bers' slips, money, and adding machines. On command, McDonald
opened the door and was arrested, the search and seizure following. He
appealed from a conviction in the District Court, alleging that the
court had erred in overruling his motion to suppress the evidence on the
ground of illegal search and seizure.
In holding that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution prevented the introduction of such evidence, McDonald v. United
States, 69 S. Ct. 191 (1948), the Supreme Court based its decision on
three factors in the case: 1) there was no emergency which warranted
immediate action, since the petitioner had been under surveillance for
several months; 2) the view through the transom would have afforded
probable cause for the issuance of the necessary warrants had the
officers taken the trouble to apply; and 3) there was no fear of the
prisoners fleeing or destroying their equipment since they were operat-
ing in ignorance of the proximity of the police officers.
In a special concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson supported the
decision on the grounds that the original entry was illegal, and hence
all of the subsequent acts, including the seizure, were illegal. The dis-
sent, dismissing the illegal entry theory on the grounds that since Mc-
Donald was merely a tenant there was no illegal entry with respect to
him, claimed the view over the transom justified the arrest of which
the search was a lawful incident. This argument rested on the transitory
and intermittent nature of numbers game operations. See Comments in
(1947) 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 413, and (1948) 38 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 629 for a discussion of the rule against unreasonable
searches and seizures.)
Positive Identification of Fingerprint by Expert Not Improper Testi-
mony of Ultimate Fact-In State v. Viola, 82 N.E. (2d) 306 (Ohio,
1948), an F.B.I. fingerprint expert was allowed to testify that a latent
print found on a glass in the barroom where the murder occurred was
left by the defendant, ".. . and no one else's finger made the impression
or could have made it." As the defense was alibi, it was objected that
this was testimony of an ultimate fact-the defendant's presence at the
site of the crime-and hence invaded the province of the jury. On
appeal the Court of Appeals of Ohio in affirming the conviction stated
that it was clear to them that the witness was merely stating his opinion
and not testifying on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence of defend-
ant. It also ruled as not prejudicial the assertion by the witness that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation "in my opinion is recognized as
being the world's authority in prints," in view of the fact that he had
spent more than fourteen years with the organization.
Privilege for Communications by Informers to Police-In the case dis-
cussed above, State v. Viola, the Ohio Court of Appeals was also asked
to reverse the conviction because the trial judge had refused to compel
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a police sergeant to divulge upon cross-examination by defendant's
counsel the name of his informant whose information led to defendant's
apprehension. The court upheld this ruling, saying: "To compel the
arresting authority to divulge the source of its information would tend
to cause persons possessing valuable information concerning crimes com-
mitted to conceal it from the proper authorities for fear of personal
harm or unwanted publicity."
Wigmore urged the same policy ground in support of this testimonial
privilege. Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) § 2374. The federal
courts also recognize it in all cases where "disclosure is not necessary
or desirable to show the prisoner's innocence." United States v. Li Fat
Tong, 152 F. (2d) 650 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
Forcing a Prisoner to Repeat Certain Words to Aid in Identification
by Complaining Witness Violates Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-
The defendant was arrested on suspicion of rape, and lined up with
other prisoners in the county jail. The prosecutrix was placed behind
them with no advice as to the identity of the suspect, and each prisoner
was forced to repeat certain words which the rapist had spoken during
the course of the crime. The prosecutrix's identification rested on her
memory of the sound of the rapist's voice from the previous night. The
South Carolina court held that while the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion did not prohibit the exhibition of physical characteristics plainly
visible, it extended to any evidence which was obtained by the aid of
the defendant. Thus, the court said, (1) any utterances made volun-
tarily would be admissible; (2) forcing the defendant to speak but not
dictating the text might be permissible since the voice could be said to
be a physical characteristic, but (3) the effect of dictating the content
of his utterances is to force him to partially re-enact the scene. (State
v. Taylor, 49 S.E. (2d) 298 (S.C., 1948). In so holding the court drew
an analogy.to a previous case which held that a sheriff could remove
a suspect's shoe and put it in a foot print, but could not actually force
the suspect to step in the print himself. (For an extensive discussion
of the general problem of the admissibility of evidence obtained by force,
and with particular attention to the issue of voice identification, see
Vol. 28, No. 2 of this Journal at pp. 261-292. Also, as regards the falli-
bility of voice identification, see Vol. 33, No. 6 at p. 487.)
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